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Old, mid-twentieth century rules still prevail in the abstracted world of scholastic, anti-humanism. The vestigial disciplinary forces mustered by fascism's philosophical apologists do not sanction any uncomfortable, reflexive consideration of their own relationship to the political ontology of race celebrated and affirmed by the likes of Heidegger, Schmitt and the other colossi of contemporary, scholastic theory. However, the continuing influence of those figures helps to make Fanon's reparative, anti-racist humanism, like the politics of national liberation, appear facile. If Nazism was, after all, not radical evil but rather a trace of metaphysical humanism that reveals the problems with all humanisms, few brave souls will be prepared to plead guilty to humanism's folly. Marxian philosophical anthropology has travelled in different directions and a whole variety of feminist pronouncements has raised questions about the relationship of gendered categories to humanity (and citizenship) as well as to the prospects of trans- and post-humanity after the end of our species' natural evolution. Why then should we care about humanism? a term that has lately been hijacked and monopolised by militant secularism of the Richard Dawkins type, a dismal formation that is studiously indifferent to the postcolonial re-configuration of our world and significantly refuses to make any gesture that might compromise its view of Islam as what Dawkins on his website recently called "an unmitigated evil". How debates over the human and its limits became linked to the struggle against racial hierarchy and to the political ontology of race are not issues of interest to civilisationist secularism or scientistic caricatures of Enlightenment. To follow Fanon's lead, we must do what they refuse to do and use intimate familiarity with Europe's continuing colonial crimes and the raciology and xenology that sanction them to orient ourselves. Then, we may ask how a refiguration of humanism might contribute to Europe's ability to acknowledge its evolving postcolonial predicament. Its relationship with migrants, refugees, displaced people, denizens, racial and civilisational inferiors and others judged infrahuman whose lives have no value even when they fall inside the elastic bounds of the law. This is an urgent matter. The problems associated with it have only been augmented by the way that security now saturates our fading political institutions. Here in the city of Vico, we cannot deny that these debates have a long and important history. Edward Said mapped a good deal of it towards the end of his book Beginnings where, for a tantalizing moment, he placed the legacies of Vico and Fanon in counterpoint.
That difficult, challenging agenda supplied something like a spine to Fanon's projects. In developing it, the starting point I favour, requires that we locate the desire to reassemble humanism in relation to his analysis of the alienated modes of social interaction that derive from the racialisation of the world and the Manichaean requirements of the colonial order which underpins it. We must then consider Fanon's demands for a new humanism as a key aspect of the non-immanent critique of merely racialised being-in-the-world that he gradually elaborates. His humanism should be understood as a vehicle for the reconstruction of that broken world and the undoing of its characteristic forms of alienation. In other words, his humanism is not a residue of, or throwback to, the nineteenth-century debates over philosophical anthropology that preceded the emergence of a scientific anatomisation of capitalist domination and its human cost. We depart from that agenda when we place racial hierarchy, racial epistemology and the political ontology of race at the centre of a self-consciously postcolonial and firmly cosmopolitan analysis. We may then begin to appreciate that humanism, as Fanon defines it, introduces new problems. There is an opportunity or perhaps an obligation to re-engage/re-enchant the human. It can be defined by the twentieth-century context in which the racial nomos that was established in the process of European imperial expansion was still, steadily being overthrown. One duty alone: That of not renouncing my freedom through my choices. This non-racial, anti-colonial, reparative humanism was licensed by the open antipathy to racism that framed it as well as by its detailed, critical grasp of the damage done to ethics, truth and democracy by the racial discourses that could not be undone even by the grotesqueries Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks dismissed as "the fraud of a black world".
The liberating decolonisation to which he contributed so much is still far from complete though the terms of its legitimation have been redefined on one side by the political rhetoric of humanitarianism and the articulation of human rights and on the other by a sequence of neo-imperial conflicts over scarce resources: energy, water, minerals etc. many of which have pronounced the tacit re-racialisation of the world in civilisationist terms: a monolithic, despotic Islam is now posed against a simplistic image of Europe as the West. This old fantasy now comes in two flavours: post-secular Christian or secular Enlightened. The racialisation of the human circulates through the conflicts it feeds, sometimes with unexpected consequences. Part of the explanation for its durability resides in the fact that postcolonial relations, struggles and wars are no longer narrowly confined to the post-imperial powers. NATO's expansive new role, like the ISAF's war in Afghanistan and the global counterinsurgency that accompanies it, make all the contributing military forces into postcolonial actors whether or not they see themselves as having been beneficiaries of earlier colonialism. More than that, there is a high degree of historical and geographical continuity between the wars of imperial decolonisation and today's global counterinsurgency campaign.
The "smart power" supposedly being deployed has moved on from the airwaves. It includes what the head of the world bank once casually called "facebook diplomacy". The infowar aspires to complete control of visual culture and through that mastery, to command of human imagination and dreamscape. We should therefore concede the growing inadequacy of older critical approaches based upon the too simple distinction between being seen and being invisible. Instead, we must appreciate the need to contest the terms of visibility and the political, legal and economic conditions within which particular regimes of seeing can be reproduced. The spectacular is only one of these. Let us recall also that the US government became a private client of the satellite imaging corporation whose digital eyes covered Afghanistan. The war conducted remotely by means of drones has been outsourced to Xe corp. The "Human-Terrain System" now ensures that anthropologists are embedded alongside warriors and info-warriors in the latest sequence of doomed military adventures which are novel only in being warranted by the liberal goal of redeeming gender equality. Europe's vulnerable gays and young women are to be protected with cluster bombs, depleted uranium shells and a new system of banking based on mobile phones that can double as cameras and screens for photographing yourself instead of circulating video clips of the latest war crimes and collateral damage. A May 2010 dispatch by Nathan Hodge from the Afghan frontline posted on www.wired.com captured this situation neatly: Things reached a chaotic peak when soldiers spotted a young man with a neatly trimmed goatee, apparently snapping photos with a cell phone camera. They stopped him, made sure the pictures were deleted from his phone and digitally scanned his irises and fingerprints with a BATS (Biometric Automated Tool Set) scanner. The young man was not detained, but now he was in the system.
The "Arab Spring" highlighted how the old colonial double standards rooted in Victorian racial theory, are still operating. The UN resolution justified intervention to protect civilians while the same civilians were being bombed by their European champions. The unsustainable repression in Libya and Syria was sharply distinguished from the bloody events underway in Bahrain where US and British strategic interests specified a different geopolitical ethics. The securitocracy of that gulf state had been designed and implemented by a highly-decorated British security-policeman, Ian Henderson, who has been repeatedly and consistently accused of being a brutal torturer both during the Kenyan emergency and in subsequent litigation as well as in Bahrain where he earned the nickname "The Butcher of Bahrain" for the steel and energy with which he organised the government's response to the 1990s revolt (see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/jun/30/uk.world). The revolting crimes of which Henderson has been accused are played down, justified and garlanded with flowers in a self-serving memoire (Man Hunt In Kenya) he penned in 1958 with the assistance of the Conservative politician, Philip Goodhart. What Henderson's career as a hammer of subversion and national liberation in Africa and the Gulf tells us now about the political geography of Europe's postcolonial statecraft cannot be adjudicated here. However, his text has other uses, not least of which is its figuration of the ambiguities intrinsic to racial hierarchy. For example, he describes what he takes to be the characteristic features of his many encounters with MauMau prisoners captured during Kenya's emergency while hunting for the Kikuyu leader Dedan Kimathi. Kimathi, like Fanon, had served in a European army fighting against the axis powers. Here is Henderson: "I often saw terrorists a few moments after their capture. Some would stand there wide-eyed, completely speechless, and shivering violently from shock and cold. They would think of the moment of death, and that moment seemed very near. Others would be past the stage of thinking at all. Mad with shock, they would shout and struggle or froth at the mouth and bite the earth.
For all the self-evident character of race as natural difference, the boundary lines between human and infrahuman, human and animal, human subject and object are not in the least bit obvious. Even, or perhaps especially, those who monopolise violence have to specify and determine that boundary in a difficult psychological setting where torture, castration and other highly sexual acts of brutality had to compete with "a reassuring pat" as the most appropriate outcome. Though Henderson's impunity has been sanctioned repeatedly by several different sovereign powers, a complex and multi-sited sequence of litigation has arisen from this case as a result of applying the contemporary legal standards defined indirectly by the language of human rights and the concept of crimes against humanity. This intervention continues to move slowly through the upper reaches of postcolonial Britain's judicial system. I must note that, apart from the effects that these cases have on the litigants and governmental actors involved, it is clear that they also impact upon our nation's understanding of its colonial history and deeper still upon the idea that British people have of themselves as a political body imbued with civilised values. David Anderson, an Oxford professor of African politics who specialises in the Kenyan "emergency" recently told the BBC that a new batch of previously secret files about to be released by the government as a result of the continuing court action would prove to be of "enormous significance". He continued: "These are a set of selected documents withheld for their sensitivity. We will learn things the British government of the time didn't want us to know. They are likely to change our view of some key places ... (their release) will clarify the last days of Empire in ways that will be shocking for some people in Britain." According to a damning internal review carried out by Anthony Cary for the Foreign Office, these documents were regarded as a "guilty secret" and simply hidden (http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/britains-secret-colonial-files/). How they came to be secret and how they acquired the capacity to shock people to this rare extent, raises a number of questions that deserve detailed historical answers beyond those I offered in After Empire. Here too, part of what is really shocking, is the way that disturbing instances of inhuman brutality can generate a painful acknowledgement of where the boundaries of the human should fall - the same lesson that is not being learned in the Mediterranean at this very moment (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants)
Following the classic contours of debate with regard to the human, a second instance of how the human is being contested in post- and neocolonial kinds of political and juridical conflict can be helpful. It relates to the future rather than the past. I want to suggest that Fanon's sense of how colonial conflict marks out new definitions and boundaries for the human can be applied to the new technological, legal and moral environments involved in the deployment of robotic military systems. The US-manufactured General Atomics Reaper is currently the RAF's only armed unmanned aircraft. It can carry up to four Hellfire missiles, two 230kg (500lb) bombs, and 12 Paveway II guided bombs. It can fly for more than 18 hours, has a range of 3,600 miles, and can operate at up to 15,000 metres (50,000ft). Richard Norton-Taylor and Rob Evans, Observer, Automated and autonomous weapons will operate without immediate human control in changing circumstances deemed too complex and rapid to be amenable to human decisions. Peter Singer's book Wired for War provides an excellent introduction to this topic. Though Britain's Ministry of Defence "currently has no intention to develop systems that operate without human intervention in the weapon command and control chain", it chose to spell out relevant legal and ethical issues in a recent briefing note: The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems which was prepared for senior officers in all branches of the military service by the MoD "thinktank", the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC): "There is ... an increasing body of discussion that suggests that the increasing speed, confusion and information overload of modern war may make human response inadequate and that the environment will be ‘too complex for a human to direct' .... The role of the human in the loop has, before now, been a legal requirement which we now see being eroded, what is the role of the human from a moral and ethical standpoint in automatic systems? Most work on this area focuses on the unique (at the moment) ability that a human being has to bring empathy and morality to complex decision-making. To a robotic system, a school bus and a tank are the same - merely algorithms in a programme - and the engagement of a target is a singular action; the robot has no sense of ends, ways and means, no need to know why it is engaging a target. There is no recourse to human judgement in an engagement, no sense of a higher purpose on which to make decisions, and no ability to imagine (and therefore take responsibility for) repercussions of action taken. This raises a number of questions that will need to be addressed before fully autonomous armed systems are fielded .... The other side of the autonomy argument is more positive. Robots cannot be emotive, cannot hate. A target is a series of ones and zeros, and once the decision is made, by whatever means, that the target is legitimate, then prosecution of that target is made mechanically. The robot does not care that the target is human or inanimate, terrorist or freedom fighter, savage or barbarian. A robot cannot be driven by anger to carry out illegal actions such as those at My Lai."
In his recent work, Achille Mbembe has approached these and related dilemmas through a meditation on what appears to be their animating political theology. It has assembled new forms of theologico-political criticism and turned to the ethico-juridical in order to answer the unsettling effects of a "radical uncertainty" prompted less by civilisational conflict and technological transformation than the steady reordering of the world that has been consequent upon its decolonisation. He continues: "... we no longer have ready-made answers to such fundamental questions as: Who is my neighbour? What to do with my enemy? How to treat the stranger or the prisoner? Can I forgive the unforgivable? What is the relationship between truth, justice, and freedom? Is there anything that can be considered to be so priceless as to be immune from sacrifice?" It is difficult to see how the history of race as political ontology, aesthetics and techné; of racism and its racial orders, can be made to count as part of how this crisis is to be answered. However, once again Fanon can help us with that difficult work. Indeed, his approach to the human and, in particular his final alignment of self and humanity in the transcendence though not the redemption of Europe remains suggestive. Perhaps it is best to say that approaching the human outside of the alienated and alienating configurations demanded by Manichaeism delirium and the racial-corporeal schema can contribute to Wynter's re-enchantment and what we might call the healing or reparative element in Fanon's thinking. That proposal, in one form or another, has been a goal common to every major political thinker of decolonisation and racial democracy. All of them turned in that direction seeking ways that art, culture, science, music, war or technological expertise could enforce a mode of human recognition that had been consistently denied and thwarted. Fanon's is the loudest clearest voice in that unhappy congregation for precisely the reasons that irritate the unassailable conventions of "identity politics" and its sophist tribunes. Fanon had begun his first book by warning his readers that its truths were not timeless. From the start, he emphasized that the racial order of the colony would bring out the very worst in anyone whose life was distorted by its founding mirage. All of the shadowy actors populating the "epidermalised" world stood to lose something precious because racial hierarchy delimited their humanity and depleted the psychological well-being of perpetrator and victim alike. Of course, those different parties (dominant and subordinate, coloniser and colonised) were not affected in exactly the same ways, but the damage done to both of them appeared in complimentary, "relational" forms. It always involved significant losses at the human level where the decay of species life that had been prompted by imperialism, opened up a path towards authentic, human history. I hope that the unfashionable, reparative humanity he affirmed might start to appear less facile in the context of global emergencies arising outside of the historic dualities of colonial power reconstituted as the foundation for contemporary securitocracy. |
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